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“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can 
the provisions of international law be enforced.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bashe Abdi Yousuf2 was a young Somali businessman who had just 
started UFFO,3 an organization that sought to improve the conditions in a 
local hospital, when he was subject to the “Mig.”4  On or around 
                                                                                                             
 1 Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of 
German Major War Criminals, The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946). 
 2 Courts and news sources use ‘Yousef,’ ‘Yousuf,’ and ‘Youseff’ interchangeably. 
For consistency, this comment will refer to the plaintiff in the case as ‘Yousuf.’ 
 3 UFFO, literally meaning “the wind behind the storm,” was founded in 1983 as a 
self-help organization comprised of local Somaliland intellectuals based in Hargeisa, 
Somalia. “In the eyes of UFFO, the government was not properly fulfilling its role as a 
provider of basic social services. The organization wanted to make a statement and 
undertook to rehabilitate the hospital of Hargeisa, without government participation or 
approval.”  Marleen Renders, Turbans and Tribes: The Building of a State and the 
Political Role of Islam in Somaliland, in 489 L’ISLAM POLITIQUE AU SUD DU SAHARA – 
IDENTITÉS, DISCOURS ET ENJEUX (Muriel Gomez Perez ed., 2005). 
 4 Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 04–1360, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *7 (E.D. Va. 
Aug. 1, 2007), rev’d, Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 
U.S.L.W. 3169 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08–1555). See also William Branigin, Somali 
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November 19, 1981, Somali National Security Service (“NSS”) agents5 
barged into Yousuf’s warehouse in Hargesia, Somalia and forced him 
into a Land Cruiser.6  The guards took Yousuf to a detention center 
where interrogators forced him down to the ground, tightly tied his hands 
and feet together with rope so that his body was arched backwards in a 
slightly-tilted “U” shape, with his arms and legs in the air, and then 
placed a rock on his back, causing him excruciating pain.7  They then 
tightened the rope causing deep cuts to his arms and legs.8  The 
interrogators were subjecting Yousuf to the “Mig”—a torture method 
that placed the prisoner’s body in a shape that resembled the Somali Air 
Force’s MIG aircraft.9  Yousuf’s interrogators questioned him about his 
activities with UFFO and threatened to continue the torture unless he 
confessed to anti-government activities in connection with his work at 
the organization.10  During his three-month detention, Yousuf suffered 
through eight water-boarding sessions and twice endured electric shocks 
to his armpits.11  He was eventually brought before the National Security 
Court, a special military court with jurisdiction over civilians accused of 
national security crimes and political offenses.12  Although he pleaded 
not guilty, Yousuf was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment and 
spent six years in solitary confinement in near to total darkness in a six-
by-six foot cell.13 
                                                                                                             
Expatriates Charged with War Crimes – Two Men Accused Now Live in Northern 
Virginia, WASH. POST, November 11, 2004. 
 5 The district court opinion presents Yousuf’s account of the political scenario in 
Somalia at the time of Yousuf’s detention and subsequent torture. The court recounts 
that, [I]n October 1969, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre led a coup that set up an 
authoritarian socialist rule in Somalia . . . .[P]ower was assumed by the Supreme 
Revolutionary Council (“SRC”), which consisted primarily of the Army officers who had 
supported and participated in the coup, including Samantar. The SRC suspended the 
existing Constitution, closed the National Assembly, abolished the Supreme Court and 
declared all groups not sponsored by the government . . . to be illegal. . . . Beginning in 
the early 1980s, the military committed numerous atrocities against ordinary citizens in 
an attempt deter the growing opposition movements. Security forces . . . were together 
responsible for the widespread and systematic use of torture, arbitrary detention, and 
extrajudicial killing against the civilian population of Somalia. Samantar, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 56227, at *2–3, *7. See also Brenda Sandburg, Exporting Justice, THE RECORDER, 
Apr. 18, 2005. 
 
 7 Samantar, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *10. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at *11 n.6. 
 10 Id. at *11. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. Yousuf eventually fled Somalia, and currently resides in Virginia, USA. Id. 
*18. 
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In 2004, seven members14 of the Isaaq clan,15 including Yousuf, 
filed suit against Mohamed Ali Samantar in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia.16  At various intervals between 1980 and 
1990, Samantar served in positions of high authority in the Somali 
military-led government, including as First Vice President and Minister 
of Defense, and Prime Minister.17  Plaintiffs18 sued under the Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”),19 and the Alien Tort Claims 
Act (“ATCA”).20  Plaintiffs alleged that Samantar, in his official capacity 
as Minister of Defense and later as Prime Minister, knew or should have 
known that his subordinates were engaged in conduct that amounted to 
gross human rights abuses such as torture, extrajudicial killings, cruel 
and inhuman treatment, and arbitrary detentions.21  Samantar argued that 
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims 
pursuant to sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (“FSIA”).22  The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ suit, holding that 
                                                                                                             
 14 There were seven plaintiffs in total, only two of which are named, the rest 
“remaining anonymous fearing reprisals if identified.”  See Branigin, supra note 5. 
 15 The district court noted that “[e]ven before Somalia became an independent nation, 
the clan system served as the fundamental building block of Somali society and attracted 
great emotional allegiance.”  Samantar, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *3 n.3. The 
post-coup military leadership favored its own clans, and oppressed the others through 
systematically building upon and exploiting the clan system. Id. This was achieved by 
“appointing members of favored clans to top governmental and military positions while 
also oppressing and targeting other clans, especially the Isaaq clan in the northern 
regions.”  Id. The District Court noted that “[m]embers of the Isaaq clan, located 
primarily in the northwestern region of Somalia, were a special target of the government 
because they were among the best educated and most prosperous Somalis, and therefore 
perceived as potential opponents to the Barre regime.”  Id. at *3. 
 16 Id. at *1. 
 17 Id. at *18. 
 18 The Fourth Circuit summarized the circumstances under which each plaintiff 
alleged that he or she suffered atrocities based on affiliation with the Isaaq clan: “Plaintiff 
Jane Doe [alleges that] she was abducted from her family home in Hargeisa by NSS 
agents, repeatedly tortured and raped, beaten to the point that she could not walk, and 
placed in solitary confinement for three and a half years . . . . [P]laintiff John Doe II 
[alleges that] although he was a non-commissioned officer in the Somali National Army, 
he was arrested . . . and then shot during a mass execution. Doe survived his non-fatal 
wound by hiding under a pile of bodies . . . . Plaintiff Aziz Mohamed Deria alleges that 
his father and brother were tortured and killed by soldiers . . . . Plaintiff John Doe I . . . 
asserts that his two brothers were abducted by government forces while tending the 
family’s livestock and then executed.”  Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 374 (4th Cir. 
2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3169 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009)(No. 08–1555). 
 19 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010). 
 20 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010). 
 21 Samantar, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *19–20. 
 22 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2010) (“[A] foreign 
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States except as 
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”). 
2010] SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY 389 
Samantar acted in his official capacity upon the directives of the Somali 
government and not for “personal reasons or motivation.”23  The FSIA 
provided Samantar with immunity from suit based on those actions.  The 
district court found that permitting such a suit against a foreign 
government official would amount to an abrogation of foreign sovereign 
immunity and would permit litigants to achieve “indirectly what the Act 
barred them from doing directly.”24  Plaintiffs appealed. 
In a decision shattering precedent set by other circuits, and 
distinguishing precedent set by itself, the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s opinion and found the FSIA inapplicable to Samantar on 
the grounds that sovereign immunity is only available to a foreign 
official continuing to be an “agency or instrumentality” of the foreign 
state.25  According to the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the linguistic 
construction of the FSIA, since Samantar was no longer an official of the 
state, immunity was not available to him under the FSIA.26  Thus, the 
Fourth Circuit effectively removed the hurdle of the FSIA to most torture 
suits against former government officials.  As Judge Duncan noted in his 
concurring opinion, the result of the Fourth Circuit’s decision was that 
future defendants would have to rely on “common law immunities that 
predate the FSIA” such as act of state immunity and head of state 
immunity.27  Samantar filed a petition with the Supreme Court, which 
has interpreted the text of several provisions in the FSIA in recent 
years.28  While it has long been the rule that the FSIA protects foreign 
governments from suit in United States courts, the Supreme Court has 
never addressed whether the FSIA also affords immunity to foreign 
government officials. 
The circuits have split on the issue of whether the FSIA is a source 
of immunity from suit in the United States for individual foreign officials 
like Samantar.29  The Seventh Circuit reversed precedent when it held 
                                                                                                             
 23 Samantar, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227, at *44. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 383 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 
3169 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08–1555). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 384. (Duncan, J., concurring). 
 28 See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S.Ct. 2183 (2009) (interpreting the 
terrorism exception to immunity); Permanent Mission of India to the U.N. v. City of New 
York, 551 U.S. 193 (2007) (interpreting the property exception to immunity); Republic of 
Aus. v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (regarding retroactivity); Dole Food Co. v. 
Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003) (interpreting the meaning of “instrumentalities of a 
foreign state”). 
 29 See RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12898, at *19 n. 8 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2009) (noting the split in the circuits). Compare In Re Terrorist 
Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2008), Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 
277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002), Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho 
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that the FSIA did not grant immunity in an ATCA suit against former 
Nigerian President, General Abdusalami Abubakar.30  Prior to the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Abubakar, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and 
District of Columbia circuits each held that the FSIA was a source of 
immunity for an individual foreign official.31  Three years after 
Abubakar, the Second Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation and sided with the majority opinion in the circuits.32  The 
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Samantar complicates FSIA jurisprudence 
and leaves the question of redress under the TVPA and ATCA unclear. 
Future litigants—especially victims of torture—are left without a clear 
path to redress; although Congress specifically provided for 
accountability for torture victims through its passage of the TVPA, 
majority circuit precedent suggests that individual foreign officials 
responsible for the acts of torture are free from suit pursuant to the 
FSIA.33 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Samantar.34  
Commentators see the case as a “litigation litmus test” for the current 
administration’s commitment to human rights.35  The Supreme Court 
must answer two questions: first, whether a foreign state’s immunity 
from suit under the FSIA extends to an individual acting in his official 
capacity on behalf of a foreign state, and second, whether an individual 
who is no longer an official at the time suit is filed retains immunity for 
acts taken in the individual’s former capacity as an official acting on 
                                                                                                             
S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999), Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al 
Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 
912 F.2d 1095, 1101–03 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that FSIA immunity extends to 
individual governmental officials for acts taken in their official capacity), with Enahoro v. 
Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2005), and Samantar, 552 F.3d at 374. (holding 
that it does not). 
 30 Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882. The complaint included claims for “torture; arbitrary 
detention; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; false imprisonment; assault and 
battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and wrongful death.” Id. at 880. 
 31 See supra note 30 for a list of cases. 
 32 Terrorist Attacks, 538 F.3d at 81. 
 33 In Re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2008), Keller v. 
Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002), Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y 
Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999), Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan 
Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and Chuidian v. 
Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101–03 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 34 Yousuf v. Samantar, 78 U.S.L.W. 3169 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08–1555). 
 35 John B. Bellinger, Litigation Litmus Test, WASH. TIMES, Monday Jan. 18, 2010 
(“[T]he [current] administration has a dilemma: If the Supreme Court concludes that 
former foreign government officials are subject to civil suits in the United States, it could 
open the door to human rights litigation against foreign government officials in the U.S. 
and complicate the administration’s diplomatic initiatives.”). 
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behalf of the foreign state.36  This note suggests that the Supreme Court 
should preserve the private right of action in the TVPA by holding that 
the FSIA does not grant blanket immunity to current or former foreign 
officials for official or unofficial acts that violate jus cogens norms.37  
This suggestion is made on two grounds.  First, when the official acts of 
current or former individual foreign official violate jus cogens norms, 
immunity granted to foreign states in the FSIA does not extend to current 
or former individual foreign officials.38  This is because under the 
normative hierarchy theory, a state’s jurisdictional immunity is abrogated 
when the state violates human rights protections that are considered 
peremptory international norms, known as jus cogens.39  Second, as 
reflected in both the legislative history and judicial interpretation of the 
TVPA, Congress intended that former and current officials would not be 
immune from suit for acts of torture. 
Part II chronicles the development of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity and its ultimate codification by Congress in the FSIA, and 
examines the provisions of the FSIA applicable to the debate at hand.  
Part III addresses the current circuit split before the Court in Samantar.  
Part IV discusses the legislative history surrounding the passage of the 
TVPA and ATCA, and their relationship with the FSIA.  Specifically, 
Part IV will discuss triggering the FSIA in cases where foreign officials 
are sued under the ATCA and TVPA.  Part V provides reasons why the 
Supreme Court should hold that the FSIA does not grant blanket 
immunity to former and current foreign officials in suits brought in 
United States courts. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AND 
ITS CODIFICATION BY THE FSIA 
The Supreme Court has said that the FSIA is the “sole basis” for 
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in an action filed in a U.S. 
                                                                                                             
 36 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 08–1555 (June 18, 2009). 
 37 A jus cogens (Latin for “compelling law”) norm is a preemptory norm that is a 
fundamental principle of international law as a norm from which no derogation is ever 
permitted. 
 38 The note does not address all violations of jus cogens norms, but rather focuses on 
torture and the private right of action granted to victims and their survivors in the TVPA. 
 39 For an exhaustive discussion of normative hierarchy theory, see Lee M. Caplan, 
State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy 
Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741(2003). Caplan summarizes the theory as follows: 
[Normative hierarchy theory] postulates that because state immunity is not jus cogens, it 
ranks lower in the hierarchy of international law norms, and therefore can be overcome 
when a jus cogens norm is at stake. [The theory] thus seeks to remove one of the most 
formidable obstacles in the path of human rights victims seeking legal redress. 
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court.40  The vague state of nineteenth century foreign sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence and the complicated and often conflicting 
procedures for seeking sovereign immunity in the twentieth century 
preceded Congress’s passage of the FSIA in 1976.41  This history is 
crucial in understanding Congress’s intention that the FSIA be the “sole 
basis” for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state against the landscape 
of the common law regarding foreign sovereign immunity for individuals 
prior to its enactment.42 
A. Nineteenth Century Origins of the Concept of Sovereign Immunity in 
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon 
When Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(“FSIA”) in 1976, the concept of foreign sovereign immunity in 
American jurisprudence was not a new one.  As early as 1812, and in 
cases involving subjects as diverse as Napoleonic maritime vessels, 
Italian olive oil, the Venezuelan civil war, and Cuban sugar 
transportation, the Supreme Court had expressed its opinion on foreign 
sovereign immunity.  In 1812, in The Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall 
wrote that while, within its own territory, a nation enjoys “exclusive and 
absolute” jurisdiction that is “susceptible of no limitation not imposed by 
itself,” the United States had impliedly waived jurisdiction over certain 
activities of foreign states.43  Widely regarded as the first definitive 
statement on the doctrine of foreign state immunity,44 The Exchange 
involved a question of jurisdiction over a French ship in the service of 
Napoleon that had sailed into an American port.45  According to the 
Chief Justice, the “distinct sovereignties” of the world possessed “equal 
rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by 
intercourse with each other.”46  States therefore impliedly consent to 
waive jurisdiction over other foreign sovereigns, and in exchange derive 
the benefit of a continued good relationship, in commerce or otherwise, 
with one another.  The Chief Justice explained his position: 
                                                                                                             
 40 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989). 
 41 See infra notes 93 to 97. 
 42 See, e.g., Justice Duncan’s observation in Samantar that “[t]he [State Department] 
has argued in analogous cases that the common law immunities that predate the FSIA 
remain the appropriate body of law under which courts should consider the sovereign 
immunity of individuals.”  552 F.3d at 384 (Duncan, J., concurring). 
 43 The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). 
 44 However, the sovereign immunity doctrine originated in the period of monarchal 
rule in Europe, and therefore pre-dates The Exchange. See CHARLES LEWIS, STATE AND 
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 11 (1980). 
 45 The Exchange, 11 U.S. at 116. 
 46 Id. at 136. 
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One sovereign . . . being bound by obligations of the 
highest character not to degrade the dignity of his 
nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights 
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to 
enter a foreign territory . . . in the confidence that the 
immunities belonging to his independent sovereign 
station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved 
by implication, and will be extended to him.47 
The Chief Justice extended this rationale to consider the immunity 
of representatives of the foreign state and foreign ministers.48  It was his 
understanding that if foreign sovereigns were not assured that their 
representatives and ministers would be exempt from jurisdiction, “every 
sovereign would hazard his own dignity by employing a public minister 
abroad.”49  That minister, in turn, would “would owe temporary and local 
allegiance to a foreign prince, and would be less competent to the objects 
of his mission.”50  Therefore, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that a 
sovereign who “[commits] the interests of his nation with a foreign 
power, to the care of a person whom he has selected for that purpose,” 
should be assured that his minister would be afforded immunity from 
suit.51  Despite the narrow facts in The Exchange, the opinion by Chief 
Justice Marshall “came to be regarded as extending virtually absolute 
immunity to foreign sovereigns.”52  Under this theory, the foreign 
sovereign would be afforded the same immunity from suit that the 
domestic sovereign enjoyed.53 
In 1897, Underhill v. Hernandez directly presented the Supreme 
Court with the question of whether foreign sovereign immunity would 
apply to a foreign official.54  In Underhill, a U.S. citizen sued a 
Venezuelan general for wrong committed against him during the civil 
war.55  The Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit’s 
                                                                                                             
 47 Id. at 137. 
 48 Id. at 139. The Chief Justice wrote, “[w]hatever may be the principle on which this 
immunity is established, whether we consider him as in the place of the sovereign he 
represents, or by a political fiction suppose him to be extra-territorial . . . still the 
immunity itself is granted by the governing power of the nation to which the minister is 
deputed.”  Id at 138. 
 49 Id. at 139. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Verlinden v. B.V. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). 
 53 For a discussion of the European and American historical underpinnings of the 
“absolute immunity” doctrine, including further discussion of The Exchange, see Robert 
B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 34 nn. 3–7 (1978). 
 54 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
 55 Id. 
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determination “that the acts of the defendant were the acts of Venezuela, 
and as such are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of 
another government.”56  Cases such as The Exchange and Underhill 
made it clear that the grant of foreign sovereign immunity was an 
exercise in “grace and comity,” and not a restriction imposed by the 
United States Constitution.57 
B. The Supreme Court’s Move From Absolute Immunity to Restrictive 
Immunity in the Twentieth Century. 
By the early twentieth century, restrictive immunity replaced 
absolute immunity because of the “increasing respect in civilized states 
for the rule of law,” and the “[i]ncreasingly large involvement of states in 
commercial and trading activities.”58  Although the absolute immunity 
principle had already been challenged in the courts of Europe,59 the 
Supreme Court’s articulation of the “absolute immunity” principle in The 
Exchange remained largely unchallenged until 1921, when the Supreme 
Court heard a case on direct appeal from the Southern District of New 
York.60  The case involved The Pesaro, an Italian government-owned 
vessel carrying olive oil for delivery to American customers.61  The 
cargo had been destroyed en route, and the recipients sued.62  The 
Southern District of New York had ruled that the restrictive theory of 
immunity applied at least in admiralty cases where the government had 
become a trading partner with a private party.63  Therefore, the vessel 
was not immune from suit in the United States.64  Largely relying on The 
Exchange, the Court reversed Judge Mack’s decision, holding that the 
absolute immunity theory still stood, and The Pesaro was immune from 
suit in the United States.65 
                                                                                                             
 56 Id. 
 57 See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486 expressing this view. 
 58 Von Mehren, supra note 54, at 36 (internal citations omitted). 
 59 Id. at 36 nn. 13–14. 
 60 The Pesaro, 277 F. 473 (1921). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 476. (“So it may be said here that the Italian government, by giving to the 
Pesaro the capacity to 
be sued in the Italian courts, voluntarily strips the Pesaro of its sovereign character and 
waives all privileges of that character; and that therefore the Pesaro is not exempt from 
suit in the United States, by reason of its governmental ownership and operation. For if a 
libel can be maintained against the steamship Pesaro in the courts of Italy, it is difficult 
to see why our tribunals should decline jurisdiction. . . .”) 
 64 Id. at 483. 
 65 Id. at 483. 
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In the period between the initial articulation of this principle in The 
Exchange and The Pesaro, and the passage of the FSIA in 1976, the 
courts moved away from judicial determination on the question of 
sovereign immunity; the Executive Branch essentially controlled the 
grant of foreign sovereign immunity.66  A foreign state faced with suit in 
the United States would apply to the State Department for a finding of 
immunity.67  Once the State Department made a determination, it would 
convey the finding to the relevant court by filing a “suggestion.”68  
However, courts treated these “suggestions” as binding determinations 
and invoked or denied immunity based upon the State Department’s 
decision.69 
By the mid-1940s, the Supreme Court’s opinions in Ex Parte 
Republic of Peru70 and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,71 made clear that 
the Court’s position on sovereign immunity was two-fold: first, the 
United States would retain the absolute immunity theory, and second, the 
courts would defer to the executive branch for sovereign immunity 
determinations.72  Ex Parte Republic of Peru presents a glimpse into the 
“accepted course of procedure” a foreign sovereign would undertake to 
request a determination of immunity from the State Department.73  In 
                                                                                                             
 66 See Verlinden v. B.V. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (“Until 1952, 
the State Department ordinarily requested immunity in all actions against friendly foreign 
sovereigns.”). See also In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 81-82 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 67 Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). In the case, the Cuban corporation 
filed suit against the Ucayali for its failure to carry sugar from Peru to New York, as per 
the terms of an existing contract. Id. at 580. After suit was filed, the Peruvian government 
intervened, stating that it was the sole owner of the vessel and that it wished to raise the 
defense of sovereign immunity. Id. 
 71 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
 72 See Republic of Aus. v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004). See also Robert B. 
von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 33, 41 (1978). 
 73 Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. at 581. The court details the course of 
procedure undertaken by the Government of Peru to secure a determination from the 
State Department that it was entitled to sovereign immunity: [The Government of Peru] . 
. . asked that the [State] Department advise the Attorney General of the claim of 
immunity and that the Attorney General instruct the United States Attorney for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana to file in the district court the appropriate suggestion of 
immunity. . . .These negotiations resulted in formal recognition by the State Department 
of the claim of immunity. This was communicated to the Attorney General by the Under 
Secretary’s letter [which] requested him to instruct the United States Attorney to present 
to the district court a copy of the Ambassador’s formal claim of immunity filed with the 
State Department, and to say that ‘this Department accepts as true the statements of the 
Ambassador concerning the steamship Ucayali, and recognizes and allows the claim of 
immunity.’  Id. 
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stating the rationale for deferring to the Executive branch, Chief Justice 
Stone reasoned that it would better serve the national interest if wrongs 
allegedly committed by a foreign power were “righted through 
diplomatic negotiations rather than by the compulsions of judicial 
proceedings.”74  Therefore, as in Ex Parte Republic of Peru, once the 
executive had determined immunity was warranted, it was the court’s 
“duty” to submit the issue to the executive for a determination of relief 
attainable through diplomatic negotiations.75 
Two years later, in Hoffman, the Court took its deference to the 
executive branch one step further when it stated that even in the absence 
of a State Department determination on the issue of immunity, it would 
“inquire whether the ground of immunity is one which is the established 
policy of the department to recognize.”76  In Hoffman, the State 
Department did not issue a suggestion either way, but rather, pointed to a 
case where a vessel was found to be in the possession and control of a 
foreign government, and one where it was not.77  The Court interpreted 
the State Department’s silence to be controlling.78  Further, the Court 
intimated that the determination of foreign sovereign immunity had 
implications in the sphere of foreign affairs, and therefore had the 
potential to embarrass the United States.79  Therefore, it was 
constitutionally appropriate for the Court in Ex parte Republic of Peru 
and Mexico v. Hoffman to defer to the executive branch on an issue of 
foreign affairs.80 
                                                                                                             
 
 74 Id. at 589. The Chief Justice further noted that “. . . courts may not . . . exercise 
their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the Government in conducting 
foreign relations . . . . In such cases, the justice department of this government follows the 
action of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an 
antagonistic jurisdiction.”  Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 75 Id. at 588–89. The court noted that the courts must accept a certification and 
declaration of immunity as a “conclusive determination by the political arm of the 
Government” that continuing the suit in the courts would interfere with the proper 
conduct of foreign relations. Id. at 589. See also Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 34. 
 76 Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36. 
 77 Id. at 31–32. 
 78 Id. at 34–35. The court reasoned that it was “not for the courts to deny an 
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new 
grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize. . . .”  Id. at 35–36 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 79 Id. 
 80 See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (delineating provisions of executive 
power, including the power to appoint and to receive ambassadors and consuls); see also 
Verlindin, 461 U.S. at 486 (“[F]oreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and 
comity . . . not a restriction imposed by the Constitution. Accordingly, this Court 
consistently has deferred to the decisions of the political branches – in particular, those of 
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C. The State Department Changes its Policy Towards Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity by Issuing the Tate Letter 
The State Department continued its policy of requesting that courts 
grant immunity to friendly foreign states until 1952 when it issued the 
so-called Tate Letter.81  The Tate Letter’s issuance articulated a shift 
from a theory of absolute foreign sovereign immunity to one of 
restrictive immunity.82  As the Tate Letter articulates, 
According to the classical or absolute theory of 
sovereign immunity, a sovereign cannot, without his 
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another 
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the 
sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or 
public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with 
respect to private acts (jure gestionis). . . . [I]t will 
hereafter be the Department’s policy to follow the 
restrictive theory . . . in the consideration of requests 
of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign 
immunity.83 
Therefore, while the State Department’s policy prior to the Tate 
Letter amounted to immunity in all actions involving friendly foreign 
sovereigns, the newer restrictive immunity policy meant that a court 
would not grant immunity to a foreign sovereign in suits arising out of 
private or commercial activity.84  The Tate Letter changed the 
                                                                                                             
the Executive Branch – on whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign 
sovereigns and their instrumentalities.”) 
 81 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. 
Perlman, Acting Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice (May 19, 1952), in 26 Dep’t. St. Bull. 
984, 984–85 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter] cited in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. 
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711, 714 (1976); See also Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689–90 (“In 
[1952], the State Department concluded that immunity should no longer be granted in 
certain types of cases. [The Tate Letter] explained that the Department would thereafter 
apply the ‘restrictive theory’ of sovereign immunity . . . .” (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)). 
 82 Tate Letter. 
 83 Tate Letter, as quoted in Altmann, 541 U.S. at 690. 
 84 Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Solicitor General, 
Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 26, 1975), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S. 
682 at 707 [hereinafter Leigh Letter] (“[S]ince 1952, the Department of State has adhered 
to the position that the commercial and private activities of foreign states do not give rise 
to sovereign immunity. Implicit in this position is a determination that adjudications of 
commercial liability against foreign states do not impede the conduct of foreign relations, 
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substantive nature of foreign sovereign immunities law in the United 
States.85  The principles of the restrictive approach were collected in the 
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 65 et. seq. (1965).86 
However, the Tate Letter had little impact on the federal courts’ 
procedural approach to immunity analysis; the State Department 
continued to issue statements regarding immunity, and federal courts 
continued to abide by them.87  As the Supreme Court explained, foreign 
nations placed diplomatic pressure on the State Department when 
seeking immunity.88  This occasionally led to suggestions of immunity 
even in situations where immunity would have been unavailable under 
the restrictive theory.89  In an additional complication, where foreign 
nations did not make requests for immunity to the State Department, the 
courts had the responsibility to determine whether sovereign immunity 
existed.90  Therefore, because “sovereign immunity determinations were 
made in two different branches, subject to a variety of facts, sometimes 
including diplomatic considerations,” it was not surprising that “the 
governing standards were neither clear nor uniformly applied.”91 
D. Congress Speaks: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
In 1976, Congress passed the FSIA92 to “free the government from 
the case-by-case diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing 
standards,”93 and to assure litigants that “decisions are made on purely 
legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process.”94  The 
purpose of the FSIA was the codification of the large body of common 
                                                                                                             
and that such adjudications are consistent with international law on sovereign 
immunity.”) 
 85 See Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703 (“It is fair to say that the ‘restrictive theory’ of 
sovereign immunity appears to be generally accepted as the prevailing law in [the United 
States].”). 
 86 See Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th. Cir. 1990) (citing 
sections from the restatement). 
 87 Verlinden v. B.V. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983). See also 
Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1100 (“[C]ourts treated such ‘suggestions’ as binding 
determinations, and would invoke or deny immunity based upon the decision of the State 
Department.”) 
 88 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 487. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1604 (2006). 
 93 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488. 
 94 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.A.A.N. 6604, 6605–
06 (“At present, there are no comprehensive provisions in our law available to inform 
parties when they can have recourse to the courts to assert a legal claim against a foreign 
state.”). See also Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488. 
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law, and in particular, the development of the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity.95  It is also possible that Congress did not want 
United States law to deviate from the existing state of international 
foreign sovereign immunity law.96 
The FSIA establishes a “comprehensive framework” for 
determining whether a United States court may exercise jurisdiction over 
a foreign state.97  It grants federal courts jurisdiction over suits against 
foreign sovereigns even where the parties are not diverse, and the 
underlying claims do not present a federal question.98  Importantly, the 
FSIA provides the “sole basis” for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign 
sovereign in the United States.99  Under the statute, a foreign state is 
presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts.100  
The FSIA provides that “a foreign state shall be immune from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as 
provided in sections 1605 – 1607 . . . .”101  The statute defines a “foreign 
state” to be a “political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state.”102  Included in the statutory definition 
of an “agency or instrumentality” is any entity “which is a separate legal 
person, corporate or otherwise, and . . . which is an organ of a foreign 
state or a political subdivision thereof . . . .”103 
                                                                                                             
 95 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1487. See also Permanent Mission of India v. New York, 551 
U.S. 193, 199 (2007) (“In enacting the FSIA, Congress intended to codify the restrictive 
theory’s limitation of immunity to sovereign acts.” (citations omitted)). 
 96 Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 38 (1978). Prior to the passage of the FSIA, “all of the important 
trading and industrial countries of the Western world, with the sole exception of the 
United Kingdom,” had adopted some form of the restrictive doctrine. Id. Moreover, the 
restrictive doctrine had been incorporated in a number of important international 
conventions. Id. For a list of international courts that adopted the restrictive theory prior 
to the passage of the FSIA, see Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 
702 n. 15 (1976) (citing to opinions from Austria, Belgium, Canada, England, Egypt, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Pakistan, Philippines and Yugoslavia.). 
 97 Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 610 (1992). 
 98 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493; 28 U.S.C.S. § 1330(a) (2006). 
 99 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) 
(“We think that the text and structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress’s intention that 
the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts.”). 
See also Weltover, 504 U.S. at 610–11; Johnson v. U.K. Gov’t, 608 F. Supp. 2d 291, 295 
(D. Conn. 2009); Cabiri v. Gov’t of Republic of Ghana, 165 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 
1999). 
 100 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993). 
 101 28 U.S.C.S. § 1604 (emphasis added). 
 102 § 1603(a) (emphasis added). 
 103 § 1603(b). 
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Courts apply the FSIA in every action against a foreign 
sovereign.104  Unless an exception applies,105 “federal courts lack subject 
matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state.”106  Determining 
whether an entity, or individual, qualifies as a “foreign state,” and 
further, whether an exception applies, is therefore crucial to the 
sovereign immunity inquiry.107  In its practical application, the statute 
“starts from a premise of immunity and then creates exceptions to the 
general principle.”108  Scholars of human rights and international law 
criticize that the theoretical hurdles such an approach builds into human 
rights litigation has resulted in sovereign immunity becoming the rule 
rather than the exception.109 
III. THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER UNDER THE FSIA, FOREIGN 
OFFICIALS SHOULD BE GRANTED IMMUNITY FOR ACTS TAKEN IN 
OFFICIAL CAPACITY 
There is a split in the circuits as to whether a “foreign official” 
qualifies as a “foreign state” under the FSIA, and therefore enjoys the 
same sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state when sued for acts taken 
in official capacity.110  While the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and D.C. 
                                                                                                             
 104 Verlinden v. B.V. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (stating that the 
FSIA “must be applied by the district courts in every action against a foreign sovereign, 
since subject-matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on the existence of one of the 
specified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.”) 
 105 §§ 1605–1607. See also Eric Engle, Frontiers In International Human Rights Law: 
The Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims’ Protection Act: Jurisdictional 
Foundations And Procedural Obstacles, 14 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L & DISPUTE RES. 1, 44 
(2006) (“[T]here are several exceptions which can be summarized as either based on (1) 
waivers of immunity or (2) commercial acts.”) 
 106 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 
488–89). 
 107 See, e.g., Xuncax et. al. v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 175–76 (D. Mass. 1995) 
(finding as a preliminary jurisidictional matter, no presumption of sovereign immunity, 
no applicable FSIA exception, and therefore, no FSIA shield to suit against former 
Guatemalan Minister of Defense). 
 108 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1487, at 17 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.A.A.N. 6604, 
6606–07. 
 109 See Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of 
the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 756 (2003). Caplan’s 
understanding is that state immunity is not a presumptive right under international law, 
but derives from a “forum state’s concession of jurisdiction.”  Id. 
 110 It is fairly clear that officials are not immune from suit when they have acted in an 
unofficial capacity. See Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1107 (9th. Cir. 
1990) (“[The official] would not be entitled to sovereign immunity for acts not 
committed in his official capacity. . . . [I]f the officer purports to act as an individual and 
not as an official, a suit directed against that action is not a suit against the sovereign.”); 
Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(“Individuals acting in their official capacities are considered ‘agencies or 
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Circuits have held that a foreign official should be granted immunity 
under the FSIA for acts carried out in his official capacity, the Seventh 
Circuit shattered precedent in holding the opposite.111  More recently, the 
Fourth Circuit held that former officials were not immune from suit, but 
current officials could avail themselves of the FSIA.112  While not siding 
with any one circuit’s position per se, this note takes the view, reflected 
in legislative history and case-law interpreting the statute, that Congress 
never intended that the FSIA provide immunity to foreign sovereign 
officials.113  As an alternative theory, this note posits that foreign 
government officials are not immune in suits alleging violations of jus 
cogens norms; the passage of the TVPA was an explicit private right of 
action for victims and their survivors to sue perpetrators of torture, and 
Congress did not intend the FSIA to be a barrier to such suits. 
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit court to address this issue 
when it held in Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank that the FSIA applied to 
individual foreign officials sued in their official capacity.114  The 
Chuidian court rejected the government’s suggestion of a bifurcated 
approach that relegated to the State Department the decision of whether 
to grant immunity to a foreign official while using the FSIA to determine 
the immunity of the state itself.115  According to the Ninth Circuit, such 
an approach would undermine the FSIA by promoting forum shopping, 
especially in situations where immunity is unclear.116  The court pointed 
out that although § 1603(b) does not explicitly use the term “individual” 
in defining foreign instrumentalities, neither does it expressly exclude 
                                                                                                             
instrumentalities of a foreign state;’ these same individuals . . . are not entitled to 
immunity under the FSIA for acts that are not committed in an official capacity.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 111 See infra notes 130 to 134. 
 112 See supra notes 26 to 28. 
 113 For a discussion of legislative history and case-law, see infra notes 227 to 235 and 
243 to 255 respectively. 
 114 912 F.2d at 1103. In Chuidian, a Philippine citizen sued an official of the 
Philippine government after the official instructed the Philippine National Bank to 
dishonor a Bank-issued letter of credit. Id. at 1097. The official was sued for alleged 
intentional interference with the plaintiff’s contractual relations with the Bank. Id. 
 115 Id. at 1099. The government’s position was that an official is not covered by the 
Act because he is an individual rather than a corporation or an association. Id. 
 116 Id. at 1102. The court explained that litigants who “doubted the influence and 
diplomatic ability of their sovereign adversary would choose to proceed against the 
official, hoping to secure State Department support.”  Id.  However, litigants “less 
favorably positioned would be inclined to proceed against the foreign state directly, 
confronting the Act as interpreted by the courts without the influence of the State 
Department.”  Id. 
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it.117  The court highlighted a lack of evidence of Congressional intent to 
exclude individual foreign officials from the purview of the Act.118  To 
the Chuidian court, this was particularly significant because Congress 
intended to codify existing common law in the FSIA.119  To cement its 
point, the court noted that a suit against an individual acting in his 
official capacity is the practical equivalent of a suit against the sovereign 
directly.120  The court concluded that allowing unrestricted suits against 
individual foreign officials would amount to a “blanket abrogation of 
foreign sovereign immunity by allowing litigants to accomplish 
indirectly what the [FSIA] barred them from doing directly.”121 
Six years later, in El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, citing 
Chuidian for guidance on the theory that an individual can qualify as an 
“agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” the District of Columbia 
Circuit dismissed claims against the Deputy Governor of the Central 
Bank of Jordan.122  The District of Columbia Circuit reaffirmed its 
position a year later in dismissing claims against members of the Abu 
Dhabi royal family for injuries to a United States citizen in a boating 
accident.123  The Fifth Circuit followed suit in Byrd v. Corporacion 
Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., holding that the FSIA extended 
sovereign immunity to individuals acting within their official capacity as 
officers of corporations that were considered foreign sovereigns.124  The 
Fifth Circuit found that individual employees of a Honduran corporation 
                                                                                                             
 117 Id. at 1101 (“‘[A]gency,’ ‘instrumentality,’ ‘organ,’ ‘entity,’ and ‘legal person,’ 
while perhaps more readily connoting an organization or collective, do not in their typical 
legal usage necessarily exclude individuals.”). 
 118 Id. (“Nowhere in the text or legislative history does Congress state that individuals 
are not encompassed within the section 1603(b) definition . . . . [A]side from some 
language which is more commonly associated with the collective, the legislative history 
does not even hint of an intent to exclude individual officials from the scope of the 
Act.”). But see Part IV infra, detailing legislative history that suggests the opposite. 
 119 Id. (“[P]re-1976 common law expressly extended immunity to individual officials 
acting in their official capacity. If in fact the Act does not include such officials, the Act 
contains a substantial unannounced departure from prior common law.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 120 Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101; See Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity, Individual Officials and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 
2D, 13 (2009) for a similar view. 
 121 Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101. 
 122 75 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The plaintiff alleged wrongful termination. Id. at 
670. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the official was acting in an individual as 
opposed to official capacity, but the court found no evidence of this, and dismissed 
pursuant to the FSIA. Id. at 671. 
 123 Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). The court found that the drivers of the boat had acted in their official capacity as 
government officials. Id. 
 124 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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whose stock was almost entirely in the hands of a Honduran 
governmental entity constituted a “foreign state” within the purview of 
the FSIA.125  The Sixth Circuit tackled the issue in Keller v. Central 
Bank of Nigeria, and citing Chuidian and El-Fadl, stated that “normally 
foreign sovereign immunity extends to individuals acting in their official 
capacities . . . .”126  In Kellar, a Michigan-based manufacturer sued 
several Nigerian citizens, including a prince, and the Central Bank of 
Nigeria.127  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit did not engage in a detailed 
discussion of the question, instead deferring to plaintiff’s concession that 
the defendant bank representatives enjoyed the same immunity as the 
sovereign state.128 
Against the weight of authority from the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and 
District of Columbia circuits, the Seventh Circuit in Enaharo v. 
Abubakar held that the FSIA did not apply to individuals. Plaintiffs in 
Enaharo brought suit against former General Abdusalami Abubakar, 
then a ranking member of the Provisional Ruling Council who in 1998 
had assumed the head of state position in Nigeria in 1998.129 Abubakar 
claimed immunity under the FSIA.130  The Seventh Circuit cautioned 
against the Ninth Circuit’s approach to statutory construction in 
Chuidian that the Fifth, Sixth and District of Columbia circuits had 
subsequently adopted: 
[The Chuidian court] looked at the statute and 
concluded that its language – the terms agency, 
instrumentality, organ, entity, and legal person – 
while perhaps more readily connoting an organization 
or collective, do not in their typical legal usage 
necessarily exclude individuals. Because Congress 
did not exclude individuals, the court concluded that 
if the individual was acting in his official capacity, the 
                                                                                                             
 125 Id. at 388–89. 
 126 Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815 (2002). 
 127 Id. at 814–15. In Keller, plaintiff Keller had been approached by defendants, one 
of whom claimed to be Nigerian royalty. Id. at 814. Defendants wanted exclusive 
distribution rights to Keller’s medical care facilities in Nigeria, and promised $25 million 
in funding. Id. However, after Keller expended $25,000 of his own funds, he realized he 
was the victim of a scam. Id. Plaintiff asserted various claims, including RICO violations, 
common law fraud, and intentional misrepresentation. Id. at 814. The district court 
concluded that the defendants were not immune under the FSIA because the transaction 
fell within the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. Id. at 815. 
 128 Id. at 815. 
 129 Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 908 (7th Cir. 2005). The complaint consisted 
of seven claims – torture, arbitrary detention, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
false imprisonment, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
wrongful death. Id. at 880. 
 130 Id. at 910. 
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FSIA was applicable. We are troubled by this 
approach – that is, by saying Congress did not 
exclude individuals; therefore they are included. Not 
only does it seem upside down as a matter of logic, 
but it ignores the traditional burden of proof on 
immunity issues under the FSIA.131 
Noting that the FSIA defines “agency and instrumentality” as a 
“separate legal person,” a phrase that “refers to a legal fiction – a 
business entity which is a legal person,” the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that the FSIA did not provide immunity to individual foreign officials.132  
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit granted Abubakar immunity for acts 
committed while acting as the head of state of Nigeria, but denied 
immunity for acts committed in his capacity as a general and a member 
of the Nigeria’s Provisional Ruling Council.133 
Three years after Abubakar, in litigation related to the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Second Circuit rejected the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation and sided with the majority of other circuits.134  In 
that case, survivors of the terrorist attacks along with insurers and 
property owners sued hundreds of parties, including four Saudi Arabian 
princes.135  Largely relying on Chuidian, the Second Circuit emphasized 
that “agency” in the FSIA “has a more abstract common meaning than a 
governmental bureau or office: an agency is any thing or person through 
which action is accomplished.”136  The Second Circuit opined that the 
term “agency” is broad enough “to include senior members of a foreign 
state’s government and secretariat.”137  The Second Circuit therefore 
found that the FSIA provided immunity to the four Saudi Arabian 
princes.138  In Velasco, the Fourth Circuit did not engage in a detailed 
discussion, but rather, deferred to the other circuits’ construction of the 
FSIA to extend sovereign immunity to individuals acting in their official 
capacity on behalf of a foreign state.139  In Samantar, the Fourth Circuit 
                                                                                                             
 131 Id. at 882. 
 132 Id. at 881–82. 
 133 Id. at 882. 
 134 In Re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 135 Id. at 75. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants played a critical role in the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks because they funded Muslim charities that in turn 
funded al Qaeda. Id. at 76. 
 136 Id. at 83. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 80. 
 139 Velasco v. Gov’t of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 399 (4th Cir. 2004). 
2010] SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY 405 
held that the FSIA does not protect a former official from suit for official 
acts.140 
In order for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split, it must 
determine the proper relationship between the Alien Tort Claims Act, the 
Torture Victim Protection Act, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act.  That in turn will determine the possibility of redress for victims of 
torture who wish to bring suit.  Part III, immediately following, discusses 
the history behind the ATCA, the TVPA, and the FSIA and explains how 
the three statutes function with respect to each other.  Part IV prescribes 
a course of action for the Supreme Court and gives reasons why the 
FSIA should not operate as a jurisdictional hurdle to suit under the 
TVPA. 
IV. TORTURE AND IMMUNITY: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TVPA 
AND THE FSIA 
The law surrounding torture, and more broadly, the violation of jus 
cogens norms, developed separately from sovereign immunity law.141  
The sovereign immunity concept and the laws surrounding it had a 
unique evolution involving a combination of commercial and diplomatic 
concerns.142  Jus cogens norms, on the other hand, “evolved out of the 
recognition that certain values or interests are common to and affect the 
international community as a whole, and that the violation of these 
values of interests threatens peace, security, and world order.”143  Jus 
cogens norms, by their very nature, are superior, and cannot be changed 
or derogated from.144  Importantly, jus cogens norms have independent 
validity and status and are untouched by the consent and practice of 
states.145  Despite debate on which norms can be considered to have 
reached this high standard, the prohibition of torture has been recognized 
to constitute a jus cogens norm.146  However, because jus cogens norms 
like the prohibition of torture developed without specific reference to 
state immunity, the relationship between the prohibition of torture and 
                                                                                                             
 140 Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 383 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 
3169 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2009) (No. 08–1555). 
 141 Lorna McGregor, Addressing the Relationship Between State Immunity and Jus 
Cogens Norms: A Comparative Assessment, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS CRIMES 69, 69 (Wolfgang Kaleck et al. eds., Springer 2007). 
 142 See supra Parts I and II. 
 143 Id. at 70 (internal citations omitted). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 71 (citing to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-
Third Session, UN GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001)). 
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state immunity remains unclear.147  This is undoubtedly the case in the 
United States, where the Supreme Court will assess the relationship 
between the Torture Victims Protection Act and the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act in Samantar. 
A. The TVPA Makes it Possible to Hold Torturers Civilly Liable When 
Criminal Liability is Unavailable 
Yousuf, the plaintiff in Samantar, hopes his suit “sends a message 
that perpetrators of human rights [abuses] will be held accountable for 
their crimes.”148  Models of accountability for human rights violations 
like torture take on various forms—international criminal suits, domestic 
and civil.  It is preferable to hold abusers criminally liable in national or 
international courts because punishment often includes a combination of 
fines and lifetime imprisonment and, in some cases, death.149  However, 
in many instances, such forms of criminal accountability are unavailable 
because of gaps in current federal law.150  For example, the torture 
statute,151 which provides for criminal prosecution of any person who 
commits torture outside of the U.S. as long as the perpetrator is within 
                                                                                                             
 147 McGregor, supra note 142, at 71. The author addresses the inconsistency in the 
treatment of sovereign immunity and jus cogens norms by comparing monist states with 
dualist states. In monist states like Italy and Greece, state immunity and jus cogens 
norms, as rules of international law, are directly incorporated into domestic law through 
constitutional provisions. Id. at 72. Therefore, because immunity and jus cogens are two 
rules of international law, the courts in monist states have denied immunity in jus cogens 
cases due to their preemptory status under international law. Id. On the other hand, in 
dualist states such as the United States, international law is not directly incorporated into 
domestic law. Id. at 78. Because the United States has legislation on immunity (that is, 
the FSIA), the courts have found immunity in cases concerning jus cogens. Id. 
 148 Branigin, supra note 5. 
 149 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1994) (“Whoever outside the United States commits 
or attempts to commit torture shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or 
both, and if death results to any person . . . shall be punished by death or imprisoned for 
any term of years or for life.”). 
 150 See Testimony of Pamela Merchant, Executive Director, The Center for Justice 
and Accountability, Before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law Committee 
on the Judiciary United States Senate, “From Nuremberg to Darfur: Accountability for 
Crimes Against Humanity,” June 24, 2008 [hereinafter Pamela Merchant Testimony]. 
Even Congress has recognized that the United States lacks criminal jurisdiction to 
prosecute the majority of acts that constitute “crimes against humanity,” and only held 
Congressional hearings on such crimes as recently as November 2007. See Congressional 
Panel – No Safe Haven: Accountability for Human Rights Violators in the United States, 
Part II – Statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division 
United States Department of Justice before the United States Senate Committee On the 
Judiciary Subcommitee on Human Rights and the Law. The subcommittee explored gaps 
in U.S. federal law that prevent criminal prosecution of human rights abusers who have 
sought safe haven in the United States. 
 151 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1994). 
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U.S. jurisdiction, is triggered only when the torture was committed after 
the date the statute was enacted, April 30, 1994.152  Defendants have also 
escaped criminal liability under the Genocide Accountability Act of 
2007.153  The war crimes statute also has limited applicability because it 
only provides for prosecution of those who commit war crimes as long as 
the victim or the perpetrator is a member of the U.S. armed forces or is a 
U.S. national.154  Consequently, many of the most egregious human 
rights abusers escape criminal prosecution, finding a safe-haven in the 
United States.155  Currently, there are approximately 1,000 open cases 
involving suspected perpetrators of serious human rights abuses from 
approximately ninety-five countries who are living in the United 
States.156 
In many situations, holding those who have abused human rights 
civilly liable for their actions might be the only legal avenue available to 
victims.  While civil actions do not have the advantage of keeping human 
rights abusers “off the streets” through lifelong imprisonment or death 
sentences, there are important benefits to be gained from civil redress,157 
including depletion of terrorist and torturer organization assets to prevent 
future acts.158  In addition, combining various federal civil statutes 
                                                                                                             
 152 Pamela Merchant Testimony, supra note 151. (“To our knowledge, since World 
War II, the federal government has brought only one criminal human rights case against a 
human rights abuser who has sought safe haven [in the United States]. . . . In December 
2006, Chuckie Taylor, Charles Taylor’s son, was indicted under [18 U.S.C. §2340A] . . . . 
[It] is the first and only case brought under the torture statute since it was enacted in 
1994.) 
 153 18 U.S.C. § 1091. 
 154 18 U.S.C. § 2441. 
 155 See also Chitra Ragavan, A Safe Haven, but for whom?  The U.S. Provides 
Sanctuary For Many of the World’s Most Wanted, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 
November 15, 1999. Congress has only recently addressed this problem. In late 2009, the 
Senate and House passed the Human Rights Enforcement Act, which would combine the 
two offices in the Justice Department with jurisdiction over human rights violations to 
create a consolidated department focused on prosecution and denaturalization of human 
rights abusers. See Press Release: Durbin’s Human Rights Enforcement Act Passes 
House, Sent to President for Signature, Dec. 16, 2009, available at 
http://durbin.senate.gov/showRelease.cfm?releaseld=320958 [Durbin Press Release](last 
visited February 14, 2010). 
 156 Durbin Press Release, supra note 156. 
 157 See Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out To the International Community: Civil 
Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism, 19 DUKE J.COMP. & 
INT’L L. 307, 308 (2009) (“A new type of lawsuit has emerged in the United States, in 
which victims . . . have pursued the perpetrators of terrorist acts and the organizations or 
nations who have enabled and funded them . . . [p]ursuant to several U.S. statutes – the 
Antiterrorism Act of 1991, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
the Torture Victim Protection Act, and the Alien Tort Claims Act – along with common 
law tort claims, such as aiding and abetting liability. . . .”). 
 158 Id. at 308. See generally Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New 
Front: Dismantling the International Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups Through 
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“maximizes the types of money damages and the range of defendants 
that can be held civilly accountable, including terrorist groups, officials, 
and other individuals, along with the foreign states, organizations, and 
agencies that sponsor them.”159  In allowing courts to hear civil claims 
against persons allegedly responsible for severe human rights abuses, the 
ATCA and the TVPA provide avenues through which victims of torture 
might seek justice. 
B. The TVPA, Codified as a Note to the ATCA, Provides an Explicit 
Cause of Action for Acts of Torture. 
The ATCA grants jurisdiction for the adjudication of violations of 
the law of nations, while the TVPA, codified as a note to the ATCA, 
provides an explicit cause of action for acts of torture. Congress adopted 
the ATCA in 1789 as part of the first Judiciary Act.160  There is scarce 
legislative history on the passage of the ATCA.161  Legal historians have 
posited various theories, some quite colorful, on the reasons for its 
passage.162  The Supreme Court itself noted that modern commentators 
have concentrated on the statute’s text because of the dearth of drafting 
history.163  In pertinent part, the ATCA provides district courts with 
“original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”164  A plain reading of the ATCA indicates that it is a 
jurisdictional statute.165  The ATCA does not grant an independent 
substantive cause of action, but provides jurisdiction in the United States 
                                                                                                             
Federal Statutory and Common-Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 679 (2005) 
(detailing the cases decided under several U.S. statutes – the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Torture Victim Protection 
Act, and the Alien Tort Claims Act). 
 159 Strauss, supra note 158, at 308. 
 160 See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 161 Id. (referring to the ATCA as a “legal Lohengrin” because “no one seems to know 
whence it came.”) 
 162 See Eric Engle, Frontiers In International Human Rights Law – The Alien Tort 
Statute and the Torture Victims’ Protection Act: Jurisdictional Foundations And 
Procedural Obstacles, 14 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L & DISPUTE RES. 1, 6 (2006) (“[I]t is likely 
that Congress may have had the fight against piracy or possibly prize jurisdiction in 
mind. . . . [A]nother possibility is that it was enacted to demonstrate to foreign powers 
that the new U.S. government was in fact committed to the rule of law.”); see generally 
Eric Engle, Alvarez-Machain v. United States and Alvarez Machain v. Sosa: The 
Brooding Omnipresence of Natural Law, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L & DISPUTE RES. 149 
(2005), for an inquiry into the legislative roots of the ATCA in the writings of Coke and 
Blackstone, as well as in parallel British legislation. 
 163 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 (2004). 
 164 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. 
 165 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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for the adjudication of torts in violation of the law of nations.166  The 
ATCA provides jurisdiction over tort suits brought by aliens only.167  
Though it does not permit U.S. citizens to sue, defendants may be of any 
other citizenship.168 
The ATCA remained relatively dormant for 209 years; in that time, 
it was invoked in only twenty-two cases.169  Plaintiffs in Filartiga v. 
Pena Irala, a landmark 1980 decision by the Second Circuit, successfully 
used the ATCA.170  In Filartiga, a Paraguayan national, brought suit 
against the Inspector General of Police of Asuncion, Paraguay, for the 
torture and wrongful death of his son.171  In allowing plaintiffs to rely on 
the ATCA, Filartiga rests on the fundamental principle of international 
law that one has a right to be free from torture vis-à-vis one’s own 
government.172  Since Filartiga, human rights lawyers have built an 
“impressive body of human rights jurisprudence” in ATCA cases.173  The 
ATCA has become an important instrument for bringing claims of 
human rights abuse before United States courts.174 
The Supreme Court recently affirmed the validity of using the 
ATCA, stating that ATCA claims must “rest on a norm of international 
                                                                                                             
 166 Eric Engle, The Torture Victims’ Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claims Act, and 
Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, 67 ALB. L. REV. 501, 501 (2003). 
 167 See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 887 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 168 Engle, supra note 163, at 501. 
 169 For a list of the twenty-two cases, see Karen Lin, Note, An Unintended Double 
Standard of Liability: The Effect of the Westfall Act on the Alien Tort Claims Act, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1718, 1757 n.109 (2008). 
 170 Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876. In Filartiga, plaintiff sued former Inspector General of 
Police of Asuncion, Paraguay, who was present in the United States, but not a citizen. Id. 
at 879. The court held that torture was a violation of the law of nations and could be used 
as a valid basis of an ATCA claim. Id. at 884. The court found that although torture may 
not have been against the law of nations at the time the ATCA became law, international 
law had since evolved to include it. Id. at 881. 
 171 Id. at 879. 
 172 Id. at 883–85. 
 173 For a list of cases in which perpetrators of human rights abuses have been 
successfully held accountable, see Sandra Coliver, et al., Holding Human Rights 
Violators Accountable By Using International Law In U.S. Courts, Advocacy Efforts, and 
Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 170 n.8 (2005). However, 
commentators have also criticized an expansive reading of the ATCA. See Adam Liptak, 
Class-Action Firms Extend Reach to Global Rights Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2007, at 
A33 (“Business groups and the State Department have urged the courts to interpret the 
law narrowly, saying that allowing such suits is a form of judicial imperialism that can 
interfere with American foreign policy.”). 
 174 See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 887 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., 
dissenting) (“[Filartiga] and its progeny made ATCA human rights suits a familiar 
feature of the federal judicial landscape . . . .”). See also Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-
Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 832–33 (2006) 
(describing ATCA as an “iconic vehicle for international human rights litigation in U.S. 
federal courts.”) 
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character accepted by the civilized world.”175  Sosa held that the ATCA 
is a jurisdictional statute that creates no new causes of action, but that the 
grant of jurisdiction was “enacted on the understanding that the common 
law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of 
international law violations with a potential for personal liability.”176  
The Supreme Court left several issues unresolved, including, 
importantly, whether applicable immunities exist.177  Although the courts 
have followed Filartiga’s lead with little judicial dissent in finding that 
the ATCA provides subject matter jurisdiction for violations of human 
rights and international law, courts disagree on which violations of 
international law are actionable under the statute.178  Codified as a note to 
the ATCA, the TVPA was an attempt to clarify which types of claims 
could be brought under the ATCA by providing an explicit cause of 
action to U.S. citizens and non-citizens alike for extrajudicial killing and 
torture.179  Congress adopted the TVPA in 1991, and President George 
                                                                                                             
 175 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 725. See Andrew B. Mohraz, Note, The 
Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004) on the 
Alien Tort Statute, 12 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 363, 363 (2006) (noting that the Court 
affirmed the use of the ATCA in human rights cases in Sosa, despite the Court’s holding 
that the statute did not permit the plaintiff to recover under the circumstances.). 
 176 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 700. 
 177 Coliver, supra note 174, at 171. Other issues left unresolved are “which ‘law of 
nations’ violations can be remedied under the ATCA and exhaustion of remedies, forum 
non conveniens, . . . the application of the political question and act of state doctrines, 
and the choice of law – international, federal, state, or the law of the forum where the tort 
occurred – to be applied to ancillary issues such as third party complicity (e.g., aiding and 
abetting liability), capacity to sue and the measure of damages.”  Id. 
 178 See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th Cir. 
2005) (holding that plaintiffs can raise separate claims for state-sponsored torture under 
the ATCA and also under the TVPA); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1144–45 
(E.D. Cal 2004) (recognizing claim for extrajudicial killing and torture under both the 
ATCA and the TVPA); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 
1179 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (recognizing claims for torture and extrajudicial killing under the 
ATCA). But see Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 885 (7th Cir. 2005) (construing Sosa to limit relief 
against torture and extrajudicial killing to the TVPA and dismissing plaintiffs’ torture 
claim brought solely under the ATCA). See also Hugh King, Sosa v Alvarez-Machain 
and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 1, 5–10 (2006) 
(detailing various cases and divergent standards). 
 179 The statute, § 3(b)(1) defines torture to include: Any act, directed against an 
individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering 
(other than pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, 
or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that 
individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind . . . .” 
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H.W. Bush signed it into law in 1992.180  The TVPA establishes “an 
unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action that has been 
successfully maintained under an existing law, [the ATCA]. . . .”181  
Legislative history182 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa183 
indicate that the TVPA did not replace the ATCA, but rather, reinforced 
it.  In the TVPA, Congress prescribed a “new cause of action accessible 
to American victims of brutality abroad,” thereby seeking to augment 
and expand the reach of the ATCA.184  The Court in Sosa reaffirmed this 
position; while cautioning courts to narrowly construe the set of 
international norms used for claims under the ATCA, the Court found a 
“clear mandate” for the same in the TVPA.185 
The TVPA’s passage as an extension to the ATCA confirmed 
congressional approval of the Filartiga line of human rights cases that 
stemmed from the ATCA.186  Both the House and Senate Judiciary 
committees pointed out that the TVPA was not meant to supplant the 
ATCA, but that the ATCA was meant to remain “intact.”187  This general 
intention is reflected in the fact that Congress enacted the TVPA without 
amending or repealing any portion of the ATCA.188  However, the 
TVPA, limiting its scope to extrajudicial killing and torture, is narrower 
than the ATCA, which courts have interpreted to apply to genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, slavery, disappearances, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and prolonged arbitrary 
                                                                                                             
 180 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and note. 
 181 H.R. REP. NO. 102–367, at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86. 
 182 S. REP. NO. 102–249, at 4–5 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 102–367, at 3–4  (1991). 
 183 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 (2004). 
 184 Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 887 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., dissenting). 
 185 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728. 
 186 Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 887 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). As Judge Cudahy notes, the 
House Report specifically refers to the concerns regarding human rights cases raised by 
Judge Bork’s concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libya, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Id. 
at 888. 
 187 S. REP. NO. 102–249, at 4–5 (“Section 1350 has other important uses and should 
not be replaced . . . . Claims based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust the 
list of actions that may appropriately be covered by section 1350. Consequently, that 
statute should remain intact.”); H.R. REP. NO. 102–367, at 4 (“[C]laims based on torture 
and summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be 
covered [under the ATCA] . . . [and therefore] that statute should remain intact to permit 
suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of 
customary international law.”) 
 188 See Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 886–87 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plain text and 
the legislative history of the TVPA indicate that it was meant to expand, not restrict, the 
remedies available under the ATCA. The text of the TVPA itself contains no implicit or 
explicit repeal of the ATCA, nor does it indicate a Congressional intent to limit or 
supercede [sic] the ATCA in any way.”). 
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detention.189  In addition, the TVPA is narrower than the ATCA in that it 
can only be used against “individuals” who act under the “actual or 
apparent authority . . . of any foreign nation.”190  However, it is broader 
than the ATCA in one respect: it provides a remedy to U.S. citizens for 
torture and summary execution that occurs under the color of foreign 
law, while only foreign nationals may use the ATCA.191  Victims have 
successfully used the ATCA and the TVPA to sue perpetrators of human 
rights abuse including, but not limited to, torture. 192  Together, the 
ATCA and the TVPA promote the protection of human rights 
internationally—the ATCA by granting aliens access to federal courts to 
redress torts committed in violation of the law of nations, and the TVPA 
by granting relief for victims of torture. 
C. The FSIA is a Gatekeeper in ATCA and TVPA Suits Against Foreign 
Officials 
The FSIA serves as a jurisdictional gatekeeper in suits against 
foreign states and foreign officials.  To prove a claim of torture under 
either the ATCA or the TVPA, each plaintiff must first establish that 
governmental actors carried out the alleged torture to which they were 
subjected.193  If sued in a U.S. court, federal or state, a defendant foreign 
official would invoke the FSIA in an attempt to show that the court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the suit against him.194  The burden of 
                                                                                                             
 189 See, e.g., Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (extrajudicial 
killing, crimes against humanity); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 373 
F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (war crimes). 
 190 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a)(1)–(2). 
 191 H.R. REP. NO. 102–367, at 4; S. REP. NO. 102–249, at 5. As the Second Circuit 
noted, whereas the ATCA speaks only in terms of jurisdiction, the TVPA goes one step 
further to create liability for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing under U.S. law. See 
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 104–5 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 192 See generally, Coliver, supra note 174, at 173 (“Since 1980, at least sixteen human 
rights perpetrators (including Pena-Irala, the defendant in the landmark Filartiga case) 
have been sued successfully. One of those was a current high-ranking government 
official: the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. Seven were former high-ranking 
civilian or military officials who continued to exercise considerable influence in their 
countries.”). 
 193 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a) (“An individual who, under actual or apparent 
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall . 
. . be liable . . . .”; H.R. REP. NO. 102–367 (noting that suits against purely private groups 
are not actionable under the TVPA, and that plaintiffs must establish some governmental 
involvement in the torture in order to bring a claim under the TVPA). 
 194 See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding as a 
preliminary jurisdictional matter, no presumption of sovereign immunity, no applicable 
FSIA exception, and therefore, FSIA did not provide a shield to suit against former 
Guatemalan Minister of Defense). 
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proving the applicability of the FSIA shifts between litigants.195  For 
example, when sued under the TVPA, the party seeking immunity from 
suit must make a prima facie showing that it qualifies as a “foreign state” 
as per the FSIA’s definition in § 1603.196  The burden of production then 
shifts to the non-movant to establish that the FSIA does not apply, either 
by showing that the entity is not a “foreign state,” or that one of the listed 
exceptions to immunity apply.197  The burden finally shifts back to the 
party claiming immunity, since that party bears the “ultimate burden of 
proving immunity.”198  If successful, the official cannot be sued, and the 
FSIA has operated as a jurisdictional gatekeeper in the action brought 
under the ATCA or TVPA against the foreign official. 
In Amerada Hess, the Supreme Court held that the FSIA provides 
the exclusive basis for jurisdiction and that an exception to the general 
rule of immunity had to fall within the enumerated exceptions under the 
FSIA.199  This approach has been adopted by several circuit courts in 
their reluctance to carve out exceptions to sovereign immunity not 
specifically enumerated in the FSIA.200  However, for the most part, 
perpetrators “were found to have had substantial responsibility for 
egregious human rights violations, [were] subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of the court, and [were] not entitled to immunity from suit 
(sovereign, diplomatic, or otherwise)” and “plaintiffs satisfied the 
requirements of standing and the statute of limitations, and demonstrated 
that they had exhausted any available and effective remedies in their 
                                                                                                             
 195 Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 196 Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882. See also Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 
815 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 197 Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882. The litigant could also show that the actions fall under 
the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
(2006), that amended the FSIA to permit claims against states which the United States 
considers sponsors of terrorism. See also Keller, 277 F.3d at 815. 
 198 Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882. See also Keller, 277 F.3d at 815 (“[T]he party claiming 
FSIA immunity retains the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout.”). 
 199 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989). 
 200 See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 718–19 (9th Cir. 
1992); Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that although “it is 
doubtful that any state has ever violated jus cogens norms on a scale rivaling that of the 
Third Reich,” even violations of that magnitude do not create an exception to the FSIA 
where Congress has created none); Smith v. Libya, 101 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(noting that, although Congress had not done so for Libya’s role in the bombing of Pan 
Am Flight 103, “Congress may choose to remove the defense of sovereign immunity 
selectively for particular violations of jus cogens, as it has recently done in the 1996 
amendment of the FSIA.”); Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“It 
is not necessary for this Court to reach the issue of whether the acts alleged by Plaintiffs 
constitute violations of jus cogens norms because the FSIA contains no unenumerated 
exception for violations of jus cogens norms.”). 
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home countries.”201  Furthermore, “[i]n several cases the courts expressly 
found that the cases did not pose a significant interference to U.S. foreign 
policy or that the act of state doctrine applied.”202 
The decision of the Court is Samantar is crucial because it will 
redefine the ability of torture victims and their survivors to seek civil 
redress in U.S. courts.  In Samantar, the Supreme Court will answer two 
questions. First the Court will address whether a foreign state’s immunity 
from suit under the FSIA extends to an individual acting in his official 
capacity on behalf of the state.203  Second, the Court will decide whether 
an individual who is no longer an official at the time suit is filed retains 
immunity from acts taken in his former capacity as an official acting on 
behalf of the state.204  The Supreme Court’s decision will have a 
profound impact on the ability of torture victims and their survivors to 
bring suit under the ATCA and TVPA against current or former foreign 
officials for violations of jus cogens norms and in particular, for acts of 
torture. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT THE FSIA DOES NOT 
PROVIDE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO INDIVIDUAL FOREIGN OFFICIALS 
FOR ACTS OF TORTURE 
A. Foreign Officials Should not be Permitted to use the Guise of Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity to Escape Liability for Torture, a Violation of a Jus 
Cogens Norm 
When the official acts of current or former individual foreign 
officials violate jus cogens norms, immunity granted to foreign states in 
the FSIA does not extend to current or former individual foreign 
officials.  Under the normative hierarchy theory, the state’s violation of 
human rights protections that are considered preemptory jus cogens 
norms abrogates the state’s jurisdictional immunity.205  A jus cogens 
                                                                                                             
 201 Coliver, supra note 174, at 174–75. In addition, “the plaintiffs satisfied the 
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norm is “a peremptory norm of general international law . . . accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.”206  The major features of jus cogens norms are the egregious 
nature of their violation, and their indelibility207  Jus cogens norms 
reflect the commitment of the international community to preventing 
human rights abuses.208  As scholars have pointed out, states do not have 
the freedom to decide not to abide by jus cogens norms.209 
However, there remains uncertainty regarding which norms fit the 
jus cogens category,210 and scholars and jurists have disagreed regarding 
the precise source of jus cogens norms.211  It is suggested that they derive 
from sources as diverse as international custom, express treaties, natural 
law, or a combination of such factors.212  It is a disagreement as to 
whether jus cogens norms are doctrinally derived or free-standing.  Each 
view has its own failures.  For example, it might be troubling to suggest 
that jus cogens norms arise out of customary international law because 
such law normally may be altered by contrary practice or consistent 
objection, thus defying the long-understood conception of jus cogens 
norms as being binding and non-derogable.213  In fact, as the Ninth 
Circuit has pointed out, customary international law and jus cogens 
norms are related, but separate concepts: 
Customary international law, like international law 
defined by treaties and other international agreements, 
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rests on the consent of states. A state that persistently 
objects to a norm of customary international law that 
other states accept is not bound by that norm . . . . In 
contrast, jus cogens embraces customary laws 
considered binding on all nations and is derived from 
values taken to be fundamental by the international 
community, rather than from the fortuitous or self-
interested choices of nations. Whereas customary 
international law derives solely from the consent of 
states, the fundamental and universal norms 
constituting jus cogens transcend such consent . . . .214 
Therefore, while the concepts of customary international law and 
jus cogens norms might share some qualities, they are in fact two 
different concepts, and it is hard to see how one is derived from the 
other.  Likewise, while a multinational treaty might be evidence of the 
existence of a jus cogens norm, and an affirmation of its status as such, 
the treaty itself may not be the source of the norm.215  The disagreement 
over the source of jus cogens norms has therefore led commentators to 
suggest that preemptory norms are “creatures without definable legal 
pedigree or doctrinal standing” that ultimately derive from the 
conscience of the international community.216  Despite disagreement 
regarding the source of a particular jus cogens norm, the establishment 
that something is a jus cogens norm informs the type of conduct that is 
presumptively illegal under international law. 
Violations of jus cogens norms are particularly egregious.  Torture, 
described as “a cruel assault upon the defenseless,”217 is one of the most 
proscribed practices in international law.  Its general aim is to “destroy a 
human being, destroy his personality, identity, . . . [and] soul.”218  
Although there are inconsistencies in the definition of what constitutes 
torture in both international and national treaties, torture is universally 
abhorred, and is regarded as a jus cogens norm of international human 
rights law.219  Torture can lead to individual responsibility under 
customary international law to the extent that all states have the ability to 
                                                                                                             
 214 See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) 
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punish acts of torture committed anywhere.  Recent scholarship has 
suggested that the almost universal acceptance of the United Nations 
Torture Convention,220 coupled with the jus cogens nature and non-
derogability of the ban on torture, leads to the conclusion that 
international law recognizes torture as a freestanding international 
crime.221  This view was confirmed by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which stated that the prohibition of 
torture “is designed to produce a deterrent effect . . . that signals to all 
members of the international community and the individuals over whom 
they wield authority that the prohibition of torture is an absolute value 
from which nobody must deviate.”222 
Therefore, government officials should never be immune for acts of 
torture because torture is never within the scope of a government 
official’s authority as sanctioned by the state.  A foreign state may not 
provide immunity by authorizing an act that violates peremptory norms 
of international law.223  The Senate Report made this clear by quoting a 
letter sent by the State Department during the ratification process for the 
Convention Against Torture, which affirmed that that the U.S. 
Government “does not regard authorized sanctions that unquestionably 
violate international law as ‘lawful sanctions’ exempt from the 
prohibition on torture.”224  Furthermore, in enacting the TVPA, Congress 
specifically referred to the obligation under the Torture Convention to 
provide victims of torture access to remedies.  Despite these statements, 
the FSIA is at risk of being interpreted by the Supreme Court in 
Samantar to provide immunity to foreign officials accused of torture and 
sued in the United States under the TVPA. 
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B. If the Supreme Court Holds That the Immunity Granted to Foreign 
States in the FSIA Extends to Foreign Officials, it Would be Stripping 
Torture Victims and their Survivors of a Congressionally Granted 
Express Right of Action 
In resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court should hold that the 
FSIA does not provide blanket immunity for all acts of a foreign official. 
Rather, when a current or former foreign official violates a jus cogens 
norm, like torture, he must be held accountable even if it was an official 
act, carried out under the state’s mandate.  The Supreme Court should 
interpret the TVPA and the FSIA together to strip away the immunity of 
current or former foreign officials who have engaged in acts of torture in 
their official capacity.  Where Congress has created an express private 
right of action for victims of a violation of a jus cogens norm, the 
Supreme Court should not take away that right.  Such a reading would 
follow congressional intent; Congress passed the ATCA and, 
importantly, the TVPA, giving a private right of action to torture victims.  
A foreign state may not provide immunity by authorizing an act that 
violates peremptory norms of international law. 
The Supreme Court should resolve the split in favor of the Seventh 
Circuit’s general view that officials who acted in their official capacity 
are not immune from suit.  Specifically in response to the two questions 
on cert, the Court could broadly hold that a foreign state’s immunity 
from suit under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1604, does not extend to an 
individual acting in his official capacity on behalf of a foreign state; and 
an individual who is no longer an official at the time suit is filed does not 
retain immunity for acts taken in the individual’s former capacity as an 
official acting on behalf of the foreign state.  However, to light the path 
towards accountability for foreign officials’ human rights violations, the 
Court does not have to adopt an expansive holding; it can limit the 
unavailability of the FSIA to violations of jus cogens norms.  And, at the 
narrowest, the court can hold that the TVPA is in itself an exception to 
the FSIA, thus foreclosing the possibility of foreign sovereign immunity 
in torture suits against foreign sovereign officials. 
C. When Congress Passed the ATCA and TVPA, Congress Intended that 
Former and Current Foreign Officials Would not be Immune From Suit 
for acts of Torture 
In the TVPA, Congress provided torture survivors with a private 
right of action against individuals who had been responsible for their 
torture. Congress codified landmark cases like Filartiga in the TVPA, 
with the intent to provide relief to victims of torture, explicitly extending 
the relief to U.S. citizens.  As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Arce v. 
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Garcia, absent a cause of action in United States courts, some of the 
worst cases regarding human rights violations would go unheard and 
unpunished because regimes that commit the most egregious human 
rights abuses are often the ones that possess the least adequate legal 
mechanisms for redress.225  Congress recognized this problem when it 
enacted the TVPA: 
Judicial protection against flagrant human rights 
violations is often least effective in those countries 
where such abuses are more prevalent. A state that 
practices torture . . . is not one that adheres to the rule 
of law. . . . [T]he . . .[TVPA] is designed to respond to 
this situation by providing a civil cause of action in 
U.S. courts for torture committed abroad.226 
If the FSIA were to extend the immunity enjoyed by foreign states 
to government officials, the intentions of Congress would be undermined 
and contradicted.   The stated purpose of the TVPA “is to provide a 
Federal cause of action against any individual who, under actual or 
apparent authority or under color of law of any foreign nation, subjects 
any individual to torture or extrajudicial killing.”227  Thus, when 
Congress passed the TVPA, it was with the understanding that immunity 
under the FSIA would not apply to former officials sued under the 
TVPA.  Through the TVPA’s extension of a civil remedy to U.S. citizens 
subjected to torture abroad, Congress wanted to enhance the remedy 
already available under the ATCA.228  When Congress passed the TVPA, 
it did so knowing that there existed traditional diplomatic immunities 
afforded to foreign diplomats and heads of state codified in the FSIA.  
The TVPA is not intended to “override traditional diplomatic immunities 
which prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts over foreign 
diplomats.”229  The Senate Report also notes that the TVPA would 
“establish an unambiguous basis” for the cause of action in Filartiga and 
“extend a civil remedy to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured 
abroad.”230 
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The House and Senate Reports dictate the specific intended 
relationship between the FSIA and the TVPA, but an analysis of the 
same reveal conflicting statements.  The Senate Report states that “only 
individuals may be sued,” and that consequently, “the TVPA is not 
meant to override the FSIA of 1976.”231  The Senate Report also 
pointedly clarifies Congress’s intent in using the term “individual” in the 
TVPA “to make crystal clear that foreign states or their entities cannot be 
sued under this bill under any circumstances.”232  Therefore, as the 
Senate Report continues, “the TVPA is not meant to override the 
[FSIA].” 233 Similarly, the House Report states that the TVPA is “subject 
to the restrictions” in the FSIA.234  The House Report and the Senate 
Report relating to the passage of the TVPA make it extremely clear that 
Congress was aware of the complications and contradictions that would 
arise with sovereign immunity under the FSIA on one hand, and a private 
right of action under the TVPA on the other. 
When Congress passed the FSIA in 1976, the statute did not state 
that the immunity afforded to foreign states would be given to individual 
officials of those foreign states. The statute only referred to foreign states 
and their agents and instrumentalities.235  A plain reading of the statute 
indicates that it does not apply to individuals.  The Second Circuit in 
Tachiona v. United States noted that with respect to § 1603(b),236 
agencies and instrumentalities are defined “in terms not usually used to 
describe natural persons.”237  The Seventh Circuit noted in Enaharo v. 
Abubakar that if Congress wanted it to apply to foreign officials, 
Congress would have said so in clear and unmistakable terms.238  The 
codification of the Filartiga principle in the TVPA further evidences this 
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intent: torture victims can seek justice in courts in the United States 
against individuals who committed the crime.239 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dole Foods Co. v. 
Patrickson stands for the proposition that the FSIA protects neither 
former officials nor officials operating outside the scope of their lawful 
authority.240  In Dole Foods Co. v. Patrickson the Supreme Court held 
that in a suit against an entity that is potentially an agency or 
instrumentality of the state, thus implicating the possible application of 
FSIA immunity, the status of the entity is determined at the time of the 
suit is filed, not at the time of the conduct giving rise to the suit.241  
Therefore, although the Ninth Circuit in Chuidian and the Fourth Circuit 
in Velasco held that the FSIA applies to officials acting within their 
scope of authority in reasoning that the individuals can be considered 
agencies and instrumentalities, the Court’s opinion in Dole mandates that 
FSIA immunity would not extend to former officials. 
D. A Long Line of Cases has Permitted Torture Survivors to Seek Justice 
and Hold Former Officials Accountable in United States Courts in 
Accordance with Congressional Intent in Passing the TVPA. 
Several cases in recent years have permitted torture survivors to 
seek civil redress against the foreign officials who have been perpetrators 
of human rights abuses.242  Each case allowing aliens and U.S. citizens 
alike to seek civil redress in federal court for wrongs committed in 
violation of international law or United States treaties follows directly 
from Chuidian’s and Filartiga’s precedent.  In Xuncax v. Gramajo, 
Guatemalan and U.S. citizens sued Hector Gramajo, a former 
Guatemalan Minister of Defense under the TVPA.243  Citing Chuidian 
for guidance, the court dismissed the applicability of the FSIA and stated 
that Gramajo was not entitled to immunity for acts of torture, because 
torture is beyond the scope of an official’s authority.244  Furthermore, the 
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court went as far as to apply the TVPA retroactively to Gramajo, despite 
the fact that the TVPA was not in effect at the time the atrocities against 
the plaintiffs were committed.245 
In Arce v. Garcia, an Eleventh Circuit case, Salvadorian refugees 
successfully sued El Salvador’s former Minister of Defense Jose Garcia 
and National Guard’s Director General Carlos Vides Casanova under the 
TVPA, alleging that military personnel tortured them during a campaign 
of human rights violations between 1979 and 1983.246  In yet another 
case, Chavez v. Carranza, former and current citizens of El Salvador 
sued Nicholas Carranza, former Subsecretary of Defense and Public 
Security.247 Plaintiffs suffered egregious human rights abuses at the 
hands of military personnel.248  Suing under the TVPA, plaintiffs claimed 
that Carranza exercised command over his subordinates to commit acts 
of torture, and to cover up those and other human rights abuses.249  The 
court granted four out of five of the plaintiffs’ summary judgment 
motions finding that the former Subsecretary committed the acts of 
torture were committed as per his command responsibility.250 
Similarly, in Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the judgment against Armando Fernandez-Larios, a former 
Chilean military officer, alleged to have participated in the execution of 
Chilean economist Winston Cabello.251  Cabello’s survivors alleged that 
Fernandez participated in Cabello’s extra-judicial killing as part of 
dictator General Augusto Pinochet’s Caravan of Death.252  The court 
found a private right of action in the TVPA to sue the official, and held 
that the TVPA was intended to reach beyond the person who actually 
committed the acts, to those ordering, abetting, or assisting in the 
violation.253  In Jean v. Dorelien, another Eleventh Circuit case, citizens 
of Haiti, successfully brought TVPA claims of torture and extrajudicial 
killing against Carl Dorelien, colonel in the Haitian Armed Forces, for 
acts of torture and extrajudicial killing.254  Scholars have identified a 
number of important objectives that these cases have accomplished.255  
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These include ensuring that the United States does not remain a safe 
haven for human rights abusers, while creating an atmosphere of 
deterrence for future human rights abuses where individual perpetrators 
are held responsible for their human rights crimes.256  Reaching these 
goals have provided victims of human rights abuse with a sense of 
official acknowledgement and reparation and inspired efforts in other 
countries to set up procedures to prosecute human rights violations in 
their own courts.257 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Yousuf v. Samantar presents the Supreme Court with a unique 
opportunity to address important questions regarding the future of human 
rights litigation in United States courts because it will do so against the 
backdrop of centuries-old precedent on sovereign immunity juxtaposed 
with evolving ideas on jus cogens norms.  First, the Court will be in a 
position to resolve the split in the circuits regarding whether former or 
current officials qualify as agents or instrumentalities of the state.  
Second, in addressing the reach of the TVPA, the Court will answer 
whether the United States provides victims with enforceable remedies 
against former officials of foreign governments responsible for torture.  
Underlying both issues is the fact that Congress passed the TVPA in 
1991 specifically to ensure that the United States would abide by its 
international legal obligations under the Convention against Torture.  
Violations of jus cogens norms such as the prohibition of torture are 
particularly egregious.  Foreign officials responsible for egregious 
human rights abuses should be held accountable and should not be 
permitted to hide under the guise of state immunity.  When Congress 
enacted the TVPA, it did so with the express intention of establishing 
liability for torturers and thereby provided victims and their survivors 
redress in United States courts.  The FSIA should not serve as a hurdle to 
such redress.  Holding that the FSIA bars suit against individual foreign 
officials sued under the TVPA would thwart the intentions of Congress.  
Therefore, the Supreme Court should hold that current or former 
individual foreign officials are not immune from suit for official actions 
that violate jus cogens norms such as torture. 
 
                                                                                                             
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. (Other contributions are the contribution to the “development of international 
human rights law and . . . building a constituency in the United States that supports the 
application of international law in such cases and an awareness about human rights 
violations in countries in all regions of the world abusers.”). 
 
